William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 3

Article 12

2003

The Impact of September 11th on Tort Law and
Insurance
Stephen P. Watters
Joseph S. Lawder

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Watters, Stephen P. and Lawder, Joseph S. (2003) "The Impact of September 11th on Tort Law and Insurance," William Mitchell Law
Review: Vol. 29: Iss. 3, Article 12.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss3/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Watters and Lawder: The Impact of September 11th on Tort Law and Insurance
L AWDER ARTICLE CURRENT FORMATTED.DOC

2/7/2003 2:22 PM

THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11TH ON
TORT LAW AND INSURANCE
Stephen P. Watters†
Joseph S. Lawder††
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................809
II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11TH ...............811
A. The Fund......................................................................811
B. Tort Recovery Alternative................................................812
III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO FUTURE TERRORISM...........813
IV. TERRORISM AND THE CHANGING DUTY TO PROTECT............815
V. THE HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF CARE ................................817
VI. DUTY AS A POLICY CHOICE ...................................................818
VII. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? .....................................................819
VIII. CONCLUSION .......................................................................820
I. INTRODUCTION
September 11, 2001. That fateful day in our history has
severely and permanently impacted our nation. The human loss at
the points of impact left a deep wound in our national soul. The
financial losses rippled outward from the zone of impact in the
form of market instability to countless layoffs in aviation and other
affected industries. Although we can rebuild the physical
destruction caused by the attacks, the irreplaceable personal and
† Stephen P. Watters, Esq., is a partner at Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, LLP,
in Minneapolis, Minnesota. As the head of Rider Bennett’s Plaintiff’s and Aviation
Litigation Practice Groups, Steve has litigated and tried many aviation, personal
injury and products liability cases related to the topics discussed in this article.
†† Joseph S. Lawder, Esq., is a partner at Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, LLP, in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. He is a member of Rider Bennett’s Plaintiff’s and
Aviation Litigation Practice Groups, representing individuals and families in
aviation accident and personal injury cases.
The authors give special thanks to Jeremy Greenhouse who contributed
significantly to the revision of this article from its original publication in the
September 2002 issue of Bench & Bar of Minnesota.
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financial losses demanded changes. The devastating nature of the
tragedy called for an enormous human, financial and military
response.
Our legislative branch quickly mobilized to redress some of
the damage. Congress first passed the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act (“ATSSSA”),1 which created a “nofault” Victims’ Compensation Fund, a $15 billion assistance
package for airlines, and a slate of mandated security measures.
Expanding on the security measures for our homeland and our
airports, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act of 2001 (“ATSA”)2 shortly thereafter. More recently, Congress
passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”)3 to guarantee,
for a limited period, the costs of insurance claims from terrorism.
For a legal system founded upon basic principles of fairness
and stare decisis, what does this legislative reaction to September
11th mean for the future of tort law and loss allocation? Has the
government undertaken an appropriate role in response to the
losses caused by terrorist acts or should our traditional tort system
alone allocate such losses? On the one hand, the government’s
measures seem necessary to preserve our economy, save our air
transportation system and insurance industry, and ensure
compensation for victims. Opponents may criticize the measures as
an unfair subsidy for affected industries that should be able to
spread the risk to the consumers of their products and services.
Regardless of where one stands on that issue, the effects of the
tragedy and the legislative response have altered tort law in this
area. Since the attack, the government and media have warned the
public of the likelihood and possible modes of the next terrorist
attack. In response to these threats and warnings, airports, border
patrols, and businesses have implemented extensive security
measures. Each of us has safety and security concerns while
traveling on an aircraft, attending a sporting event, visiting a
national landmarks, using a bridge or being near a power plant.
Does our increased awareness of security, derived from past
terrorist acts and the real threat of future terrorist activity in our

1. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (Sept. 22, 2001) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 40101).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 114).
3. Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (Nov. 26, 2002) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 6701).
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homeland, raise the standard of care for businesses and property
owners in providing security for employees and customers? If so,
how extensive is the duty to provide such protection? What is a
reasonable measure of security? What is a foreseeable use of a
product? What is a foreseeable terrorist threat? These are among
the questions businesses, property owners, and their insurers must
find answers to based on the previously unforeseen becoming a
reality.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11TH
A. The Fund
American citizens have been victims of terrorist activity many
times in the past in situations not involving aviation – the
Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing, the U.S.S. Cole, and the
first World Trade Center bombing. Although each was a terrible
tragedy, the damage, loss of life and effect on particular industries
and our economy in those situations were not as great as the effects
of September 11th. Hijackings and terrorism on international
flights, such as the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland, have also been risks that we have accepted and dealt with
through the tort system. Our legal system traditionally handled
damage caused by terrorist acts like any other mass disaster. The
fault-based approach to liability and damages did not yield to the
enormity of each tragedy.
But the attacks of September 11th – the hijackings out of our
own airports of aircrafts full of United States citizens to be used as
suicide missiles on our own national landmarks – did not represent
a known or accepted risk and caused unprecedented damage,
financial peril and insecurity. The government acted quickly. In
eleven days it passed the ATSSSA4 into law establishing three major
components: an airline assistance package,5 an assortment of
mandated security measures,6 and the September 11th Victims’
Compensation Fund of 2001 (“the Fund”).7 Airports, airlines and
aircraft manufacturers received protection through limitation of
4. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (Sept. 22, 2001) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 40101).
5. 49 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
6. Id. § 501.
7. Id. § 401.
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their liability to the extent of their liability insurance.8 As a
countermeasure to that apparent limitation of liability and the risk
of uncollectibility, the Fund was designed to ensure compensation
for victims of the terrorist attacks.9
The Fund provides compensation to individuals who suffered
physical injury, or to representatives of individuals who died as a
result of the attacks,10 provided they do not seek restitution for
claims through the courts.11 There is no liability or negligence
showing required to recover from the Fund.12 It is a classic “nofault” system, similar to no-fault automobile insurance covering
medical expense and wage loss that many states, including
Minnesota, have adopted. The Fund, however, prohibits civil
recovery in court except from the terrorist entities.13
The Fund also includes several significant provisions that affect
the amount of damages that can be recovered. For example, it
prohibits punitive damages14 but allows the recovery of both
“economic” as well as a broad range of “noneconomic” damages,
including physical and emotional pain and suffering.15 In order to
achieve consistency and predictability with respect to economic
damages, Fund recovery sacrifices significant economic recovery for
higher income earners16 and reduces recovery to the extent of
collateral sources such as life insurance.17
B. Tort Recovery Alternative
While no-fault systems typically foreclose any alternative
recovery, victims of September 11th can elect to forgo the Fund
and seek traditional tort recovery. However, there are procedural
and practical difficulties with doing so. For one, a plaintiff’s choice
of venue is limited to the Southern District of New York.18 Further,

8. Id. § 408(a).
9. Id. §§ 401, 403.
10. Id. § 405(a)(2)(B)(i).
11. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B).
12. Id. § 405(b)(2).
13. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B).
14. Id. § 405(b)(5).
15. Id. § 405(a)(2)(B)(ii).
16. U.S. DEP’ T OF JUSTICE, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIMS’ COMPENSATION FUND OF
2001, PRESUMED ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC LOSS TABLES § II.A.1 (2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/vc_matrices.pdf.
17. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(a) (2003).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 408(b)(3) (2002).
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the limited liability of airlines, airports and manufacturers will at
some point affect a plaintiff’s ability to recover large judgments.
Perhaps the most significant deterrent comes from the uncertainty
of being the test case for future plaintiffs.
The risk of foregoing Fund recovery and the prospect of
establishing liability for entities (other than terrorist entities) are
daunting challenges.
Obviously, the terrorists and their
organizations are primarily to blame, but can sufficient facts be
pled, discovered and proven to allocate fault to the airlines, the
airport security companies and other potential defendants? While
it is easy to theorize various claims and lay blame in the abstract,
principles such as foreseeability and causation pose hurdles that
the facts might not overcome. For example, does a security
company breach its duty when it allows a passenger to board
carrying a box-cutter that at the time was not prohibited on
aircraft? Seemingly beyond the limits of causation are claims
against the aircraft manufacturers, the airports, the FAA, security
officials in the World Trade Center, the NY/NJ Port Authority,
designers and builders of the World Trade Center, manufacturers
of products contained in the buildings, and flight schools that
trained terrorists.
Evidentiary issues also make proof of crucial facts very difficult.
Other than cockpit voice recordings and cell phone calls, there is
little evidence as to what weapons the terrorists used in the
September 11th attacks. If claims against the airline are based on
vicarious liability for hiring the security companies, and there is
little or no real independent basis for the facts leading up to the
impact with the World Trade Center, the challenge may be
insurmountable. Yet, the heightened standard of care owed by
airlines as common carriers to their passengers may nonetheless
allow such claims to proceed.
These considerations, commentators suggest, will lead most
victims of September 11th to seek compensation from the Fund.19
III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO FUTURE TERRORISM
Congress has also responded legislatively to the increased risk
and loss allocation problem caused by terrorism following
19. E.g., Raymond L. Mariani, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001 and the Protection of the Airline Industry: A Bill for the American People, 67 J. AIR L.
& COM. 141, 182 (2002).
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September 11th. It did this through the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002 (“TRIA”), which Congress approved in November
2002.20 TRIA notes that the reasonable and predictable availability
of insurance against catastrophic loss is crucial to economic growth
and stability, and that the ability of the insurance industry to cover
losses from any future terrorism likewise is crucial to economic
recovery.21 However, given the difficulty of making statistically valid
estimates of the probability and cost of future terrorist events, the
insurance industry could understandably respond by either
terminating coverage for terrorist events or dramatically increasing
premiums—both of which could seriously hamper economic
activity. 22 The purpose of TRIA, therefore, is:
[T]o establish a temporary Federal program that provides
for a transparent system of shared public and private
compensation for insured losses resulting from acts of
terrorism, in order to —
(1) protect consumers by addressing market
disruptions and ensure the continued widespread
availability and affordability of property and casualty
insurance for terrorism risk; and
(2) allow for a transitional period for the private
markets to stabilize, resuming pricing
of
such
insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future
losses, while preserving State
insurance regulation
and consumer protections.23
In a nutshell, the government will partially cover the costs of
insurance claims resulting from defined instances of terrorism for
three years. For the first year, the insurance companies will have to
cover an amount equal to 7 percent of their previous year’s
premiums, rising to 10 percent in the second year, and 15 percent
in the third.24 The remaining portion of the losses will be borne by
the government up to a total payout cap of $100 billion.25 As one
industry advocate explained, “[o]ur entire focus [in advocating for
TRIA] was to increase the capacity and ability of private insurance
20. See Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (Nov. 26, 2002) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6701).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 101(a).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 101(b).
24. Id. § 102(7)(A-D).
25. Deirdre Davidson, Business Gave Insurers’ Fight Stronger Focus How a Broad
Coalition of Insureds Helped Turn Tide on Terrorism Bill, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002,
at 1.
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to provide terrorism insurance . . . . We think this bill does that . . . .
[I]t gets the market stabilized.”26
TRIA means that for a limited time, the government will
ultimately bear the risk of catastrophic losses caused by terrorism if
the viability of the insurance industry is threatened. Like the
Victims’ Compensation Fund of ATSSSA, TRIA ensures the
compensation of victims and the preservation of the insurance
industry.
Unlike the ATSSSA Fund, TRIA places initial
responsibility on businesses and their insurers under a fault-based
approach to loss allocation. However, the government will still
ultimately back up the enormous catastrophic losses.
IV. TERRORISM AND THE CHANGING DUTY TO PROTECT
The shifting responsibility for losses must be accompanied by
ascertainable and understandable standards upon which that
responsibility is assigned. Moreover, although the ways in which
the losses occurred are unique and appalling, the framework in
which to judge whether others in addition to the terrorists should
bear responsibility is largely in place in modern American tort law.
Although Minnesota courts have yet to deal with terrorist
attacks, the assignment of responsibility to business and property
owners for the intentional acts of others has largely developed
under the duty to protect. Minnesota Supreme Court Justice
Simonett explained the practical difficulties in arriving at and
specifying such a duty to protect:
[A] duty to protect against the devious, sociopathic, and
unpredictable conduct of criminals does not lend itself
easily to an ascertainable standard of care uncorrupted by
hindsight nor to a determination of causation that avoids
speculation. There is a difference between a landowner’s
duty to sand a slippery step on his premises and his duty
to contain a slippery criminal. In the latter instance, the
landowner is being asked to take defensive measures
against a third person not within his control,
indeed,
someone who tries to outwit any defenses.27
As a general rule, Minnesota does not recognize a legal duty to
control the conduct of a third person to prevent him from causing
harm to another.28 However, courts will find such a duty when the

26.
27.
28.

Id. (quoting Jeffrey DeBoer, president of the Real Estate Roundtable).
Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. 1989).
Sulik v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 747, 750 (D. Minn. 1994).
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parties have a “special relationship,” such that one party has in
some way entrusted his or her safety to the other.29 Furthermore,
even if a duty to protect exists, the duty only extends to
“foreseeable” acts, an inquiry that is partially subsumed in the
special-relationship inquiry.30 Thus, a business or property owner’s
liability for damage caused by the terrorist acts of another will
depend upon both the owner’s relationship with the plaintiff and
the foreseeability of the terrorist act.
Minnesota courts have found a “special relationship” in a very
limited number of situations: certain hospital-patient
relationships,31 landlord-tenant relationships,32 and most recently,
in a merchant-customer relationship.33 Among the factors
establishing a special relationship are:
• the extent to which the plaintiff is vulnerable or
deprived of opportunities for self-defense;
• the extent to which the plaintiff has entrusted his safety
to the defendant;
• whether the defendant is in a position to protect the
plaintiff;
• whether the property or business presents a particular
focus or unique opportunity for criminals.34
If there is no special relationship, there is no duty to protect.35
However, if a special relationship is found, the defendant’s duty to
protect only extends to foreseeable risks.36 The test of foreseeability
is whether the defendant is aware of facts indicating that the
plaintiff was being exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm.37 The
extent of foreseeability shapes the nature of the defendant’s duty
and sets the standard of care. As Justice Cardozo said, “[t]he risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk

29. Id.
30. Spitzak v. Hylands, Ltd., 500 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
31. See, e.g., Roettger v. United Hosp., 380 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
32. See, e.g., Vermes v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 251 N.W.2d 101, 105-06 (Minn.
1977).
33. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169.
34. Id. at 168-69.
35. United Prod. Corp. of Am. v. Atlas Auto Parts, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 401, 403
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
36. Spitzak v. Hylands, Ltd., 500 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
37. Id. at 158.
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imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range
of apprehension.”38
Since September 11, 2001, the foreseeability of terrorism – the
“risk reasonably to be perceived” – has increased dramatically. The
formerly unthinkable is now a distinct possibility. This heightened
foreseeability has infused the duty to protect with a similarly
heightened standard of care.
V. THE HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF CARE
September 11th has taught us that terrorism can cause
widespread damage in unique, unexpected ways. The media
regularly puts the public on notice and has heightened our
awareness of possible terrorist threats to air travel, nuclear power
plants, treasured sites and landmarks, communication systems, and
environment. Our government has responded to the nation’s
demand for preparedness at least with regard to aviation and
transportation. In the Aviation Security and Transportation
Security Act of 2001, specific security measures have been
implemented: baggage screening, federalization of the aviation
security work force, bag matching, air marshals, cockpit protection,
National Guard security at airports, and carry-on restrictions.39
Because we are now more cognizant of, and have mandated
security against, terrorist activities, will responsibility be accordingly
apportioned when that security is breached in the future?
Our heightened awareness of terrorist and security risks (risks
that are arguably more foreseeable today than prior to September
11, 2001) provides the opportunity to re-examine this question
under the fact-specific inquiry of the special relationship test.
Certainly we have heightened expectations of reasonable protective
measures in the aviation setting. The heightened duty of care owed
by airlines will be further raised when it comes to measures that are
designed to protect against criminal acts. The legislated security
changes will define the minimum standard of care owed, and the
breach of which will yield liability, including negligence per se. But
with the government stepping into a security role, courts will
delineate the limits of discretionary immunity in this context. This
38. Id. (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)).
39. Peter Dizikes, Plane Truths Since Sept. 11, There Are Plenty of New Laws; But Is
Flying Safer? (March 11, 2002), at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/business/DailyNews/airsecurity_sixmonths0203
11.html (last visited January 15, 2003).
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increasing awareness and preparedness will also affect the
vulnerability to litigation of any business that congregates large
numbers of people and any structure that is “high profile” or a
desirable target.40
With respect to the damages caused by September 11th, the
temptation to turn hindsight into the standard of care by which all
of the stakeholders are judged does not seem fair, both because of
the unforeseeability of the attack and because the victims will be
compensated by the Fund. An irony of September 11th is that
although the manner of attack was unforeseeable, the World Trade
Center “parking ramp” was previously the target of a terrorist act –
the first terrorist bombing in 1993. It seems a stretch to argue that
September 11th was foreseeable in light of the first World Trade
Center bombing, and even more difficult to argue what the
standard of care required. However, the future will be less
forgiving, and courts will be more inclined to view terrorist threats
as foreseeable, particularly when the cost of prevention or
minimizing harm is not onerous.
VI. DUTY AS A POLICY CHOICE
The existence of a business or property owner’s duty of
reasonable care to protect against foreseeable terrorist threats will
also depend on various policy considerations, including a balancing
of costs and benefits. As the Minnesota Supreme Court explained:
Presumably, we do not live in a risk-free society; if this is
so, a cost-benefit analysis is unavoidable. To post security
guards at each parking ramp level 24 hours a day might
be the most effective crime deterrent, but the cost may be
prohibitive for both the property owner and the customer
. . . . The question of how much security is adequate
raises, therefore, the further question of how much risk is
an acceptable risk for members of the public.41
In Minnesota, any decision to expand on the duty owed by
property and business owners must recognize that not all terrorist
or criminal activity is preventable. It is difficult to imagine a
reasonable way to guard against the theft and use of a small plane
loaded with explosives and crashed to destroy a stadium or mall. A
cost-benefit analysis would counsel against imposing continuous
40. Ed Bethune et al., What’s Expected Now: The ‘Reasonable Man’ Standard for
Liability Is Much Higher Since Sept. 11, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at 24.
41. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. 1989).
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monitoring of all small aircraft for this purpose where the financial
impact on the general aviation industry is already precarious and
the public would be asked to absorb the increased costs incurred by
the government. On the other hand, if the imposition of a duty
would yield procedures that prohibit access to ventilation systems
in prominent structures, or that plan and train for the orderly
evacuation of a building, and the expense is justifiable, the costbenefit analysis should not prohibit the duty. The emphasis in the
standard should be on the practicality of minimizing injury and
damage that could have been limited or prevented even where the
initial act or impact could not have been.
Interestingly, the precautionary security measures and disaster
plans that businesses are implementing derive from what they
perceive as a real threat. It is good business to be prepared and to
protect your employees and customers. This precautionary
conduct is driving the emergence of a duty and shaping the
contours of the standard.
Perhaps the “next attack” scenario will involve circumstances
beyond the reach of foreseeability. But in the wake of September
11th and the frenzied discussions of security in the media, mall
owners, entertainment venues, utility operators, office buildings
and other public and private gathering places have been put on
notice by the predictions of the media and the suspicions of
experts and the government. The generic merchant-customer
relationship which was previously indistinguishable in the eyes of
the law from the situation “out on the street and in the
neighborhood generally,”42 will be subject to reconsideration where
that relationship focuses on the attractiveness of the location as a
potential terrorist target. If a parking ramp presented a particular
focus and unique opportunity for criminal activity justifying “some
duty” before the age of homeland terrorism, this new world we live
in demands a greater one.
VII. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
A business or property owner seeking to ascertain what security
measures are required, and at what cost, faces a difficult task. The
goal of the law in this area is to determine what measure of
protection would be satisfactory or reasonable and to assign
responsibility for damages proximately caused by the breach of
42.

Id.
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those reasonable, expected measures. Obviously, the standard of
care depends on the circumstances confronted by each business or
property owner. How much preparation and security would satisfy
this duty is dependent on the unique circumstances involved.
Some general guidance can be found in language from the
Minnesota Supreme Court, which could easily be applicable to a
case emanating from a future terrorist attack:
The operator or owner of a [______________] has a duty
to use reasonable care to deter criminal activity on its
premises which may cause personal harm to customers.
The care to be provided is that care which a reasonably
prudent operator or owner would provide under
like
circumstances.
Among the circumstances to be
considered are the location and construction
of
the
[_________], the practical feasibility and cost of various
security measures, and the risk of personal harm to
customers which the owner or operator knows, or in the
exercise of due care should know, presents a reasonable
likelihood of happening. In this connection, the owner
or operator is not an insurer or guarantor of the safety of
its premises and
cannot be expected to prevent all
criminal activity.43
Because such a standard will be applied by judges and juries
who live in the very same society in which these risks have come to
life, the risk of liability based upon what, in hindsight, would have
avoided a particular tragedy, will always be present.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Imperfect as the system is, it incorporates familiar guideposts
to the assignment of financial responsibility, such as the special
relationship test and the concept of foreseeability, but still allows
for the consideration of individual circumstances. This return to
the fault-based approach of loss allocation from the “no-fault” Fund
created after September 11th reflects the emerging awareness and
risk of terrorism in our homeland. The government’s guaranty
against the catastrophic losses of large-scale terrorism, however,
also assures that victims will not go without compensation.
Although in the end the taxpayers may carry the burden, freedom
is priceless.

43.

Id. at 169-70.
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